Fundamental Rights Report 2020 (excerpts), 2020

3. RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND RELATED INTOLERANCE

[..]

3.2. LEGAL AND POLICY INITIATIVES TO CURB HATE CRIME AND HATE SPEECH FALL SHORT

[..]

In Estonia, the penal code explicitly prohibits incitement to hatred,30 while punishment for hate crimes can be imposed by applying a provision regarding aggravating circumstances.

30 Estonia, Penal Code (Karistusseadustik), § 151, 1 September 2002

[..]

In 2019, Estonia, 40 Hungary41 and Spain42 published instructions and guidelines for criminal justice personnel for identifying, recording, investigating and prosecuting hate crimes. [..]

40 Estonia, Ministry of Justice (Justiitsministeerium), email correspondence, 16 September 2019. The guideline was published in 2016 and updated in 2019.


Document data: 11.06.2020. ISBN 978-92-9474-895-9 Link: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf

Internal Security Service annual review 2019 (excerpts on minority activism), 2020

DEFENDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

[..]

The 1990s – a time to learn how to swim at the deep end

[..]

[..] As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the immigrants brought to Estonia during the occupation period – the majority of whom were Russian-speaking – were left stateless and unemployed. Thousands of retired Russian military personnel, former professional members of the military, and former employees of the Soviet security structure remained in Estonia. This was seen by the Kremlin as an opportunity to influence our domestic politics6 and accuse Estonia on the international stage of discriminating against Russian-speakers. [..]

6 Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, did not wish to accept them as Russian citizens, instead hoping that Estonia would grant them citizenship. As Estonian citizens, they would have gained the right to directly influence the situation.

In the 1990s, Pyotr Rozhok,7 Oleg Morozov, Eduard Shaumyan, Yuri Mishin and Esya Shur – who were primarily active in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa county, and who acted under the collective name of the Union of Russian Citizens – aspired to become the representatives of the Russian-speaking population. At the instigation of the Russian Embassy, they organised frequent, unauthorised demonstrations against alleged violations of the human rights of Russian-speakers, which initially went unpunished due to inadequate legislation. These activists, who dreamed of Russian chauvinism, were not capable of cooperating with each other and they lacked sufficient support, which is why they failed to achieve any success in domestic politics.

7 Also the representative in Estonia of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

[..]

Post-millennium changes

[..]

In the early 2000s, the Russian Embassy, including intelligence officers, under the guidance of the Presidential Administration of Russia, led the effort to group various Russian-speaking associations in Estonia under one umbrella organisation [..] The requirement to speak the official language and efforts to desegregate the education system were presented as discrimination against the Russian-speaking community. Subsequently, the Kremlin has used the alleged need to protect the Russian-speaking population as a pretext for aggression against Georgia and Ukraine.

In addition, there was an effort to strengthen influence by bringing together local Russian-speaking political parties that wished to represent the Russian-speaking population. [..]

[..]

During this period, the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, a non-profit association founded in Estonia in 1994, developed into an important tool in the Kremlin’s influence operations. For the Kremlin, this is probably considered the most successful influence project against Estonia. The rhetoric of the protection of human rights opened international financial taps, which, in turn, legitimised the centre’s activities and its accusations of human rights abuses in Estonia. The existence of ethnic groups who had real reason to worry about the survival of their culture was hushed up. For the international community, ethnic minorities in Estonia had to identify with Russians. In other words, there was an attempt to create a single imaginary Russian super-minority, the preservation of whose occupation-era privileges would serve as a measure of the human rights situation. This partly succeeded, but not in a definitive and irreversible way.

There is, of course, no way around the riots of April 2007.15 Retrospective reports often overlook the fact that tensions around the so-called Bronze Soldier were exacerbated by a few Russian extremists with political ambitions in connection with the 2005 local government elections. [..] What happened around the Bronze Soldier was similar to the actions organised against education reforms in Latvia.16 [..]

15 We covered the causes and conclusions of this in more detail in the KAPO annual reviews between 2006 and 2008.

16 Members of the Nochnoy Dozor (Klenski, Linter, Siryk) involved in the April riots previously also protested against the planned reform of Russian-language schools in Estonia in 2007. In addition, the Russian Embassy intervened and there were aggressive influence operations in the Russian media

[..] Admittedly, the Estonian activists were acquitted in court of organising the April riots. [..]

One example of the dangers of living in a Kremlin-controlled information space and the need for a unified education system was the unauthorised demonstration by Russian-speaking students against the Iraq War in the spring of 2003 in front of the US Embassy in Tallinn. This developed into a violent breach of public order.17 [..]

17 The demonstration was initiated by Dmitri Kondrashov, the founder of the short-lived youth association Front and former correspondent for Regnum (Baltiskii Mir – no longer published), who subsequently fled to Russia.

In the light of the April riots, the Kremlin further acknowledged its need to work with young people abroad and to involve and influence them. Greater attention was paid to Russian-speaking school children in Estonia, who were mainly living in the Kremlin-controlled information field. For example, they were offered free participation in military camps in Russia.

[..]

Inciting and exploiting extremism

[..]

[..] Energised by the influence operations fund, which functions in the guise of legal protection, there were renewed calls, mainly spearheaded by municipal politicians, for the preservation of the Russian-language education system, originally created as part of the Soviet policy of Russification, as well as the special status for the Russian language. In lieu of public support, they managed to find sympathy and funding mainly from the Russian Embassy. With the support of the influence operations fund and the Russian Embassy, local pro-Kremlin activists began to participate regularly in the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meetings of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. There, characteristically taking advantage of the West’s freedom of speech, they regularly engage in the unilateral vilification of Estonia with messages prescribed by the Kremlin. [..]

[..]

2019: A lack of ideas and resources in the politics of division

[..]

Even more dangerous are the Kremlin’s attempts to promote cooperation in sensitive fields and seek direct contacts with local government. For example, various educational agreements with regions and institutions in Russia may work against Estonia’s educational policy goals, hinder the educational integration of Estonia’s inhabitants, and promote instead the objectives of the Kremlin’s politics of division. Recently, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly called for a vigorous implementation of the national programme “Support and Promotion of the Russian Language Abroad”. It is in the Kremlin’s interest to maintain Russian-language education in schools abroad, which is why teachers are provided with in-service training and students are offered learning environments and encouraged to continue their education in Russia.


Document data: 14.04.2020. Link: https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/Annual%20Review%202019.pdf

2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (excerpts), 2020

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

[..]

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

PROPERTY RESTITUTION

The government has laws and mechanisms in place for property restitution, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and advocacy groups reported no issues with the government’s resolution of Holocaust-era claims, including for foreign citizens.

[..]

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

[..]

B. FREEDOMS OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

The constitution provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the government generally respected these freedoms.

The annual remembrance ceremony commemorating the World War II Battle of Sinimae mentioned in previous years’ reports again occurred. Three members of Parliament participated in the event.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

While the constitution provides for freedom of association, the law specifies that only citizens may join political parties. There were no restrictions on the ability of noncitizens to join other civil groups.

[..]

G. STATELESS PERSONS

UNHCR categorized 77,877 persons residing in the country as stateless as of the end of 2018. As of January 1, according to government statistics, there were over 72,400 residents of undetermined citizenship, or 5.5 percent of the population. Nearly all were ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, or Belarusians. These persons are eligible to apply for naturalized citizenship, and some of them may hold Russian, Ukrainian or Belarusian citizenship.

There are statutory procedures that offer persons over the age of 18 opportunities for obtaining citizenship by naturalization, but some human rights observers regarded them as inadequate, and their rate of naturalization remained low. To facilitate acquisition of citizenship, authorities adopted such policies as funding civics and language courses and simplifying naturalization for persons with disabilities. The government also simplified the Estonian language requirements so that applicants older than 65 are no longer required to take a written language examination, although they still must pass an oral one. The government also provides citizenship, without any special application by the parents, to persons younger than 15 who were born in the country and whose parents were not citizens of Estonia or of any other country, and had lived in Estonia for five years at the time of the birth of the child.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

[..]

ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

[..]

Participation of Women and Minorities: No laws limit participation of women or members of minorities in the political process, and they did participate. The law allows only citizens to organize or join political parties.

Noncitizens who are long-term residents may vote in local elections but cannot vote in national elections or hold public office.

[..]

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

[..]

CHILDREN

Birth Registration: Citizenship derives primarily from the citizenship of at least one parent. Either citizen parent may pass citizenship to a child regardless of the other parent’s citizenship status. Children born to parents who are not citizens of Estonia or of any other country and have lived in the country for five years, acquire citizenship at birth. Registration of births occurred in a timely manner.

[..]

ANTI-SEMITISM

The Jewish community numbered an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 persons.

On March 16, the chief rabbi of Estonia was verbally attacked by a 27-year-old man under the influence of drugs, who insulted the rabbi and shouted anti-Semitic remarks in the center of the capital. The perpetrator was sentenced to eight days in prison for the offense. The prime minister condemned the incident, stating that discrimination based on religion, nationality, origin, or any other reason was totally unacceptable.

On June 23, unknown vandals knocked over and vandalized five gravestones at the Rahumae Jewish Cemetery in the capital. Police opened a criminal investigation which was pending at year’s end.

On January 28, the government held an annual memorial event on Holocaust Remembrance Day at the Rahumae Jewish Cemetery in Tallinn. Schools participated in commemorative activities throughout the country. The Education and Research Ministry, in cooperation with the Estonian Jewish community, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, the Estonian Memory Institute, and the Museum of Occupation, organized an essay writing competition on topics related to the Holocaust for schoolchildren.

[..]

NATIONAL/RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITIES

In 2018 police registered five cases of physical abuse, breach of public order, or threats that included hatred against persons from racial or ethnic minorities.

On March 26, police opened investigations regarding a verbal attack and an attempted physical attack against two persons of color by four men in the center of Tartu. The investigations were pending at the end of the year.

Members of the Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE, a part of the governing coalition) made derogatory and racist public statements regarding ethnic minorities, immigrants, refugees, women, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community. Of note, during parliamentary swearing-in ceremonies, members of parliament from EKRE made hand gestures associated with white nationalism. No disciplinary action was taken. Also notable, an EKRE member of the European parliament also referenced the Holocaust and “the final solution” in a social media post on how best to handle refugees living in Europe.

Knowledge of Estonian is required to obtain citizenship, and all public servants and public-sector employees, service personnel, medical professionals, and other workers who have contact with the public must possess a minimum competence in the language. Russian speakers stated that Estonian language requirements resulted in job and salary discrimination. The government continued to provide free and subsidized opportunities for Estonian language learning.

In districts where more than half the population spoke a language other than Estonian, the law entitles inhabitants to receive official information in their language, and authorities respected the law.

Roma, who numbered fewer than 1,000, reportedly faced discrimination in several areas, including employment. The government took steps to emphasize the importance of education for Romani children, but their school dropout rate remained high.

Nonwhite residents reported discrimination in housing. The government faced difficulties finding housing for resettled refugees, which refugee advocates attributed to societal discrimination.

[..]

Section 7. Worker Rights

[..]

D. DISCRIMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATION

The law prohibits discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. The government generally enforced the law prohibiting discrimination in employment and occupation, and penalties were sufficient to deter violations. If workers claimed discrimination and turned to the courts, and the Labor Inspectorate or gender equality commissioner and the appropriate institution found the suit justified, workers were indemnified by employers. With respect to employment or occupation, labor laws and regulations require employers to protect employees against discrimination, follow the principle of equal treatment, and promote equal treatment and gender equality. Nevertheless, discrimination in employment or occupation occurred with respect to age, gender, disability, ethnicity, and language (see section 6), and there were complaints to the gender and equal treatment commissioner, the legal chancellor, and the Labor Inspectorate.

[..]

Russian speakers worked disproportionately in blue-collar industries and continued to experience higher unemployment than ethnic Estonians. Some citizens and noncitizen residents, particularly native speakers of Russian, alleged that the language requirement resulted in job and salary discrimination. Roma reportedly faced discrimination in employment (see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).


Document data: 11.02.2020 Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/estonia/

ECSR conclusions on Estonia under Article 17 RESC (excerpt on citizenship), 2020

Article 17 – Right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection

Paragraph 1 – Assistance, education and training

The Committee takes note of the information contained in the report submitted by Estonia.

The legal status of the child

The Committee has noted with concern the increasing number of children in Europe registered as stateless, as this will have a serious impact on those children’s access to basic rights and services such as education and healthcare.

According to EUROSTAT in 2015 there were 6,395 first time asylum applications in the EU by children recorded as stateless and 7,620 by children with an unknown nationality. This figure only concerns EU states and does not include children born stateless in Europe or those who have not sought asylum. In 2015, UNHCR estimated the total number of stateless persons in Europe at 592,151 individuals.

According to Human Rights Watch [It’s time to end Child Statelessness in Estonia] in January 2016, about 6.1% of Estonia’s population of 1.3 million was stateless – that is, 79,300 people. Despite a few advances in reducing child statelessness since then, Estonia has not fully addressed the problem.

In addition, the Committee notes from the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Children on the combined second to fourth periodic report [CRC/C/EST/CO/2-4, March 2017] that amendments to the 2015 Citizenship Law grant Estonian citizenship to children with undetermined citizenship born in the State. However, the UN Committee expressed concern that these amendments do not apply to children aged 15 to 18, and limited attention is paid to stateless children who arrive in the country in the context of migration, partly because of the absence of a comprehensive procedure to determine if a person is stateless.

Therefore, the Committee asks what measures have been taken by the State to reduce statelessness (such as ensuring that every stateless migrant child is identified, simplifying procedures for obtaining nationality, and taking measures to identify children unregistered at birth)


Document data: conclusions XXI-4 (2019), March 2020. Link: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-est-en/16809cfba8

ECSR conclusions on Estonia under Articles 16, 17 RESC (excerpts on Roma), 2020

Article 16 – Right of the family to social, legal and economic protection

[..]

Measures in favour of vulnerable families

In reply to the Committee question, the report provides information about the families with disabled children. As regards Roma families, the Committee also notes that according to data from the population census of 2011, there were 456 people of Roma origin living in Estonia. According to the report, as the Roma community is rather small is Estonia, no separate measures have been created for the Roma. Equal opportunities and social protection are guaranteed for the Roma living in Estonia on the same basis as for other residents of Estonia. The Committee asks what measures are taken to protect single-parent families.

Housing for families

[..]

In its previous conclusions (Conclusions 2011, 2015), the Committee asked information on measures taken to improve the housing situation of Roma families. It also held that if the next report did not provide the necessary information, there would be nothing to show that the situation is in conformity with Article 16 of the Charter on this ground (Conclusions 2015).

In reply, the report stresses that according to the latest population census (2011), there were 456 people of Roma origin living in Estonia. As the Roma community is rather small, no separate measures have been created for Roma. The report indicates that equal opportunities and social protection are guaranteed for the Roma living in Estonia on the same basis as for other residents.

[..]

Article 17 – Right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection

Paragraph 1 – Assistance, education and training

The Committee takes note of the information contained in the report submitted by Estonia.

The legal status of the child

[..]

The Committee further asks what measures have been taken to facilitate birth registration, particularly for vulnerable groups, such as Roma, asylum seekers and children in an irregular situation.

[..]

Child poverty

[..]

The Committee asks the next report to provide information on the rates of child poverty as well as on measures adopted to reduce child poverty, including non-monetary measures such as ensuring access to quality and affordable services in the areas of health, education, housing etc. Information should also be provided on measures focused on combatting discrimination against and promoting equal opportunities for, children from particularly vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, Roma children, children with disabilities, and children in care.

[..]

Paragraph 2 – Free primary and secondary education – regular attendance at school

[..]

Vulnerable groups

In its previous conclusion (Conclusions 2015) the Committee sought further information about the situation of Roma children, in particular any measures adopted following the study ’Roma in the Estonian Education System – issues and solutions’, and information on the placement of Roma children in special needs schools. The Committee noted that in 2014/2016 a project to improve the quality of counselling for Roma students was to be launched and asked to be informed of the results of this project.

According to the report, children of Roma origin study in either Estonian-language or in rarer cases, also in Russian-language schools. There are no separate schools or classes in Estonia which are only attended by Roma children. Roma children study in the context of the common national curricula and are not separated from other students.

The report refers to the results of a survey, sponsored by the Population Register and the Ministry of Education and Research and supported by the North Estonian Roma Association, which show that as of 2010, there were 90 children in Estonia of compulsory school age whose parent or parents were of Roma origin. The report also states that according to the data provided by the Estonian Education Information System in November 2017, 55 pupils in general education schools have identified Roma as their home language.

According to the report in Estonia, the transfer of children to specialized schools takes place on the basis of need and can only take place with the consent of the parent or legal guardian and on the basis of a medical evaluation. The placement of Roma children in schools for children with special educational needs or directing them to study on the basis of a simplified curriculum in a basic school, is based on the same grounds as for other children.

The Committee asks how many children of Roma origin attend special schools and how many follow a simplified curriculum in regular schools.

The report states that in order to support Roma children and Roma students, the Ministry of Education and Research has planned various measures, such as relevant in-service training courses for members of advisory committees and counselling centres.

The Committee asks to be kept informed of measures taken to improve educational outcomes for Roma children including information on enrolment, drop out and completion rates.


Document data: Conclusions XXI-4 (2019), March 2020. Link: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-est-en/16809cfba8

Country Report Estonia 2020 (excerpts on education), 2020

3. REFORM PRIORITIES

[..]

3.3. LABOUR MARKET, EDUCATION AND SOCIAL POLICIES

[..]

3.3.3. EDUCATION AND SKILLS

[..]

Higher education is insufficiently aligned with labour market needs and dropout rates are high. Although tertiary educational attainment in the 30-34 age group is currently above the EU average (47.2% compared with 40.7%), it may worsen if the high dropout rates from higher education and falling enrolment rates ( 32) persist.

32 Besides demographic trends, enrolments are negatively impacted by a high share of early school leavers and an increasing proportion of upper secondary graduates that do not continue studying, in particular men, Russian speakers, and graduates from schools in remote areas (MoER, 2017).

[..]

The performance gap between Estonian and Russian-medium basic schools persists and strengthens regional disparities as well as hindering the mobility across the country because of the language barrier. The proficiency in Estonian of students with a different mother tongue remains low: less than 61.4% of graduates from basic schools where Russian is the language of instruction master Estonian at intermediate (B1) level, well below the national target of 90%. To support Estonian language learning from an early age, a pilot project providing Estonian-speaking teachers in pre-school education groups was launched in the two Russian-speaking regions. The project is expected to be further expanded in 2020 to cover basic schools too.

[..]


Document data: 26.02.2020; SWD(2020) 505 final. Link: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2020-european_semester_country-report-estonia_en.pdf

Human Rights situation in certain countries (excerpts), 2020

Estonia

In their reports, the international human rights organizations allege that the Republic of Estonia systematically violates national minorities’ fundamental human rights guaranteed by international instruments and rejects or ignores multiple recommendations by the relevant agencies and bodies of the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as the leading international NGOs.

Although Estonia’s Russian-speaking community comprises about 360 thousand persons (i.e. about 27 per cent, nearly one third of the country’s population), Estonian constitution establishes a privileged status of ethnic Estonians and their language and culture, 894 and the country openly pursues the policy of restricting political, social, economic and cultural rights of non-Estonian population.

894 The Preamble of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia stipulates that “the state… must guarantee the preservation of the Estonian people, the Estonian language and the Estonian culture through the ages”.

It is indicative that Tallinn has never acceded to a number of key international treaties governing the rights of national minorities. As for the treaties and instruments it did ratify, such as the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, those are implemented incorrectly or are not implemented at all. The public human rights institutes existing in the country address the challenges faced by non-Estonian population ineffectively and rather serve as the instrument of justifying the authorities’ ethnocratic policy.

The persisting phenomenon of massive “non-citizenship” through which the “ethnic purity” of the Estonian passport is ensured, is the most blatant manifestation of discrimination based on language and ethnic origin. The “non-citizens” are persons (mostly ethnic Russians) who failed to obtain Estonian citizenship in 1992 as they had neither been citizens of the Republic of Estonia in 1920–1940, nor the descendants thereof. They are deprived of their rights under the pretext that Russian population was “brought into” the country during the “Soviet occupation”, and cannot claim equal status with the native population. This is a flagrant violation of the norms and principles of the Treaty on Inter-State Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia concluded in January 1991, in particular, of the provisions of Article 3, which stipulates that “the Parties shall provide opportunity of obtaining the citizenship of their countries to all permanent residents of the relevant territories in accordance with their freely expressed wishes”. Estonia has also failed to properly explain why persons that were born in Estonia after 1991 are also denied their civil rights.

Estonia is one of the world’s top ten countries in terms of the number of “non-citizens”. As of 1 July 2019, there were over 75 thousand thereof (about 6 per cent of the population).

Despite regular criticism on the part of the international organizations, including human rights agencies of the UN, OSCE and the European Parliament, and the human rights NGOs, Estonian authorities have continued, since 1991, to pursue their course towards building a mono-ethnic and mono-national state and deny the mentioned category of the country’s residents full and equal citizenship.

The expansion of “non-citizenship” ceased only on 1 January 2016 after the legal amendments entered into force, granting citizenship to the children of the holders of gray passports, born in the territory of Estonia. In 2019 as an additional “bonus” the “non-citizens” were provided with an opportunity to attend the government-funded courses of the Estonian language in order to subsequently pass the relevant exam and apply for citizenship.

In March 2019, in its Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Estonia on the compliance of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern over great number of persons with undetermined citizenship, which, as of 1 January 2019, reached 5.5 per cent of the country’s population. The vast majority of such persons are citizens of the former USSR who were not able to acquire Estonian citizenship due to their lack of proficiency in the Estonian language after 1991. The Committee criticized the limited nature of the 2015 amendments made to the Citizenship Law, as they did not apply to stateless children aged between 15 and 18 years old as at 1 January 2016, children born to stateless parents who had not been legally resident in Estonia for the preceding five years and stateless children whose parents had Estonian nationality but were unable to transmit their citizenship to their child. 895 Thus, the mentioned amendments in no way contribute to the early and efficient resolution of the issue of “non-citizens”.

895 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en

It should be noted that prior to that, in January 2017, the Committee on the Rights of Child had already stressed that the amendments to the Citizenship Law did not apply to children with undetermined citizenship in the age category of 15 to 18 years and had urged the State party to fast track the naturalization of such children. 896

896 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reports of Estonia. January 2017, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/EST/CO/2-4&Lang=en

In April 2019 the Human Rights Committee in its Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Estonia concerning its implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expressed concern at the limited scope of the amendments insofar as they excluded certain categories of “non-citizen” children; the stringent language requirements that form part of the naturalization tests; and the adverse impact of the “undetermined citizenship” status on the right of long-term residents to political participation and recommended to take measures to address the mentioned gaps. 897

897 Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Estonia. March 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/EST/CO/ 4&Lang=en

In July 2019 the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights issued its final report on the parliamentary elections held in Estonia in March 2019, noting that the Estonian authorities should take steps to further “increase the naturalization rate among persons with «undetermined citizenship», with a view to granting them full suffrage rights”.

Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Dunja Mijatovic during her visit to Estonia on 11–15 June 2018 expressed regret that the authorities failed to ease conditions of naturalization for persons above 65. Many of the Russian-speaking older persons are still unable to obtain Estonian citizenship because of their inability to learn the Estonian language. 898

898 https://rm.coe.int/report-of-the-council-of-europe-commissioner-for-human-rights-dunja-mi/16808d77f4

The Estonian side once again disregarded the observations and recommendations.

Severe infringement of the rights of national minorities, primarily of the Russian-speaking one, to education in their mother tongue, remain a pressing issue. Estonian authorities continue to ignore The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities, elaborated at the initiative of the High Commissioner on National Minorities Mr. Max van der Stoel in October 1996 and containing references to fundamental international instruments in this sphere: the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Article 4), the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (Article 5), the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (paragraph 34), and the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Article 14).

The Russian language is almost completely banned from Estonian universities. Thus, in Tallinn University, the only opportunity to study in Russian is to major in Russian Philology (Bachelor’s degree) and Slavic Languages and Culture (education in Russian is still available in some private universities, in particular in Mainor Business School and the Estonian Academy of Arts).

Furthermore, there is a growing tendency towards Estonization of upper secondary education (years 10 to 12). According to the country’s laws, in upper secondary schools, no more than 40 per cent of subjects can be taught in Russian.

Estonian authorities abstain from further legislative steps aimed at de-Russification for political motives, but pursue the tactic of merging Russian-language and Estonian-language upper secondary schools under the pretext of “integration and optimization”. As a result, schools come to be solely Estonian-language regardless of the opinion of Russian-speaking students and their parents. The merging of two Russian-language and one Estonian-language upper secondary schools in Kohtla-Järve (where over 75 per cent of population is Russian-speaking) in 2019 into single state upper school where subjects are taught in Estonian is a vivid example of such approach. Since the beginning of the academic year, over 10 per cent of Russian-speaking students have left the school. The Estonian Ministry of Education cited the students’ poor knowledge of the official language as the cause. The new school principal Hendrik Agur’s allegations of the school-leavers’ lack of readiness to adopt “Estonian school culture” evoked broad negative response of the Russian community. Yet when the issue of establishing the new school was discussed in spring of 2019, Mailis Reps, Minister of Education, and Hendrik Agur assured the parents of the Russian-speaking students that they would create the necessary conditions and provide the necessary language support so that Russian-speaking students could study in Estonian. Similar steps are also to be taken in Narva, the population of which is also predominantly Russian-speaking, although the efficiency of such “optimization” has never been proven.

Basic Russian-language schools (years 1 to 9) so far have been let to teach up to 100 per cent of school subjects in Russian. However, the Estonian language component is also steadily enhanced in such schools. There is an increasing number of schools taking part in “language immersion” programmes, which provide for teaching some subjects in Estonian while gradually increasing its use.

In 1990s professional training and development programmes for Russian-speaking teachers were discontinued, which also had an extremely negative effect on education in Russian.

As a result, within recent ten years the number of Russian-language basic schools in Estonia reduced from 96 to 77.

Public activists point out that it not the poor knowledge of Estonian by Russian-speaking students that poses the main obstacle to the integration of such students, but the Estonian authorities’ failure, after all the years since the country’s independence, to ensure quality Estonian language teaching. Both textbooks and Russian-speaking teachers are lacking. As for Estonian teachers, those are unwilling to teach in Russian-language basic and upper secondary schools.

Recently, a campaign has been launched to convince the public that introduction of the “uniform school” and “single education system” is a “necessary and welcome step”. “Single education system” implies that rather than keeping Russian-language, as well as Estonian-language schools and kindergartens, educational institutions with uniform curricula will be established where subjects will be taught in Estonian and non-Estonian-speaking students will be provided with some unspecified optional opportunities to preserve their mother tongue.

In late 2018, Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid was quoted by the media as saying that the country had virtually made a decision to introduce a single education system in Estonian. In July 2019, Helir-Valdor Seeder, Chair of the Isamaa political party, which is part of the governing coalition, stated that Estonia would completely switch to instruction in Estonian and that at that moment, experts were discussing ways to do that as fast and effectively as possible. It should be noted, however, that the Estonian authorities had not discussed this matter with the Russian-speaking community.

The activities of the Language Inspectorate, a special supervisory and punitive body outside parliamentary and public control also serves the strengthening of linguistic discrimination of non-Estonians. Its functions include exclusively identifying insufficient proficiency in and use of the Estonian language and consequently imposing sanctions and fines incommensurate with infringements found. The authorities have ignored observations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance of the Council of Europe concerning the repressive nature of the Inspectorate’s activities and the lack of control over it.

Discrimination on grounds of proficiency in official language in Estonia was also noted by international human rights review procedures. In August 2014, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted with concern that while the Equal Treatment Act prohibited discrimination against an employee or potential employee based on criteria such as nationality and ethnic origin, different treatment due to Estonian language proficiency was not considered discrimination if such treatment was permitted by the Public Service Act or the Language Act. In that connection the Committee was concerned at the discrepancies between the employment and income levels between the Estonian and non-Estonian population as a result of language proficiency. It also noted the persistently high number of persons with undetermined citizenship. 899

899 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Concluding observations on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Estonia. August 2014. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/EST/CO/10-11&Lang=en

In January 2017, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern over the language policy in secondary education, which often prevented Russian-speaking students from acquiring mastery in core subjects that were taught only in Estonian. It also noted the discrimination faced by children belonging to ethnic minorities and children with disabilities in accessing education. 900

900 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the combined second to fourth periodic reports of Estonia. January 2017, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/EST/CO/2-4&Lang=en

In February 2019, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern over the lack of flexibility in the implementation of the 60 per cent quota for teaching in Estonian in the Russian-speaking upper secondary schools. CESCR believed that often made it difficult for Russian-speaking students in Russian-speaking schools to acquire mastery in core subjects that were taught only in Estonian and, in the case of vocational schools, lead to an insufficient number of qualified teachers capable of teaching the specialized subjects so as to adequately reflect this percentage and the school specificity. The situation is further aggravated by Estonian authorities’ punitive approach to enforcing the Language Act, including through the mandate and functions of the Language Inspectorate. 901

901 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en

In March 2019, Human Rights Committee expressed concern at the impact of the language policies and practices, which continued to frustrate the full enjoyment of rights by the Russian-speaking population on an equal basis with the rest of the population of the country. It also supported the CESCR’s finding about the lack of flexibility in the implementation of the quota of teaching in Estonian. 902

902 Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Estonia. March 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/EST/CO/ 4&Lang=en

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights subjected Estonia’s authorities to criticism for the persistent discrimination in all public spheres experienced by non-Estonian-speaking population due to a lack of proficiency in the Estonian language. This is illustrated by the high unemployment and poverty rates among the non-Estonian-speaking population. 903

903 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en

Disproportionate representation of Estonian and non-Estonian communities in local authorities, especially in Tallinn, remains a challenge. Under-representation of non-Estonian minorities in public and political spheres in Estonia was, in particular, stressed by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 904 Estonian capital has about 350 thousand voters, and according to the principle of proportional representation, each member of the City Council (comprising 79 members) should be elected for 4,430 voters. However according to the Law on Elections to Local Authorities in reality it takes about six thousand voters to elect a City Council member in a “Russian-speaking” constituency and only two thousand voters to elect such member in an Estonian constituency.

904 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Concluding observations on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Estonia. August 2014. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/EST/CO/10-11&Lang=en

Although Estonian authorities have formally envisaged a right to the use of a second language in local authorities in areas where the official language is not the mother tongue of the majority of the population, in practice they have limited the enjoyment of this right in the country’s northeast areas inhabited by Russian-speaking minorities. In accordance with the 2011 Language Act (Part 3 Article 5), only citizens of Estonia can be considered members of a national minority (i.e. “non-citizens” and Russian citizens permanently residing in these areas are not taken into account). Thus, in the town of Narva, where Russians account for 90 per cent of the population, only 47 per cent of citizens are non-Estonian, which renders it impossible to use Russian as the language of communication with the local authorities.

This issue is also insistently raised by the UN human rights treaty bodies. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted with concern the high threshold for allowing the use of a minority language in communications with the local authorities in areas where people belonging to a linguistic minority group reside traditionally or in substantial numbers. It also expressed concern at the disproportionately strict conditions for the use of traditional local names, street names and other public topographical indications in a minority language in areas where people belonging to a linguistic minority group reside traditionally or in substantial number. 905

905 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en.

Estonia, who ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in late 1990s, evades compliance with Article 11 of this Convention obliging its States Parties to recognize national minorities’ patronyms, and refuses to enter those in national identity documents issued to ethnic Russians. Furthermore, Estonian authorities disregard relevant concerns expressed by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In particular, in February 2019, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that administrative barriers against the use of patronymics in official personal documents, which Estonian authorities put up, restricted certain national minorities from enjoying their right to protect their cultural identity. 906

906 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en.

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In March 2018, the Ministry of the Interior of Estonia denied access to the country till 2023 to Konstantin Zatulin, member of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, who planned to meet with voters, Russian citizens residing in the northeast of the Republic of Estonia. [..]

Furthermore, Estonian special agencies use a wide range of ways to put pressure on politicians, public figures, human rights champions and journalists that demonstrate the lack of loyalty or simply fail to share official point of view on domestic and foreign policy of the country, or try to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking community. They resort rather often to criminal prosecution under invented pretexts. The most blatant cases involved members of the Russian community. In August 2019, the court imposed a fine on Andrey Krasnoglazov, head of the non-profit organization Tallinn Pushkin Institute, for document forgery and using forged documents. In July 2019, police detained and subjected to many-hours questioning Mstislav Rusakov, head of human rights non-profit organizations Kitezh and Russian School of Estonia. All his data storage media and means of communication were confiscated and a criminal case was instigated against him for “providing false data to the register of legal entities”.

The content of Estonian mass media is silently subjected to heavy censorship in order to prevent them from criticizing the shortcomings of government policy in the field of inter-ethnic relations [..]

[..] Strong negative attitude is encouraged towards the First Baltic Channel (a franchise of the Channel One Russia), which is accused of inciting Russian-speaking population to “disloyalty” to Estonia and of generating their negative attitude towards the policy of the EU and NATO.

Neo-Nazi ideas and theories continue to spread in Estonia, and in many cases there is evidence suggesting the involvement of Estonian authorities in these activities. This creates conditions for the popularity of radical nationalist political parties.

International human rights agencies have noted an abundance of discriminative practices. In August 2014, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern at the absence of amendments to the Penal Code that prohibit racist organizations, the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or racial hatred and that made racially motivated hate speech and incitement to hatred a criminal offense punishable by law. In addition, the Committee noted with concern the leniency of the punishment (a fine of 100 euros) imposed in 2011 under section 151 (1) of the Estonian Penal Code for commentaries posted on the Internet whose contents were found to have incited hatred and violence. Besides, it was noted that racial motivation did not in general constitute an aggravating circumstance in proceedings under Estonian criminal law. 908

908 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Concluding observations on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Estonia. August 2014. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/EST/CO/10-11&Lang=en

In March 2019, the Human Rights Committee noted that the Equal Treatment Act did not afford equal protection against discrimination on all the grounds prohibited under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in all spheres of life. The amendments to the Equal Treatment Act intended to expand its scope of protection against discrimination restrict such protection to social welfare, health care and social insurance services and allowances, education and access to and supply of public goods and services, rather than to all spheres of life.

The Committee was most alarmed by the fact that the current legal framework did not provide comprehensive protection against hate speech and hate crimes due to, inter alia, the light penalties and the high threshold for the offense of incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination under article 151 of the Criminal Code, which required “danger to the life, health or property” of the victim. Other acts, such as the public denial, justification or condoning of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or hate propaganda that is racist or otherwise inciting to discrimination, are not prohibited by law. In this context one can hardly be surprised by the numerous reports of hate speech, including by opinion makers and politicians, and hate crimes. 909

909 Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Estonia. March 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/EST/CO/ 4&Lang=en

In addition, Estonian authorities continue to impose misinterpretation of joint Russian-Estonian history based on nationalist ideology and Russophobia. The Soviet period, which was dubbed by Estonian historians as the “occupation of 1940–1991”, and the events of the Great Patriotic War in the territory of the country are most blatantly falsified. On this basis they cultivate the myth of “freedom fighters” who fought in the ranks of Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and punitive units against “Soviet aggressors”, camouflaging the glorification of Nazi criminals and their accomplices. Alongside with that, the war crimes committed by Estonian collaborators, primarily their involvement in punitive operations against civilian population, extermination and torture of the prisoners of concentration camps and Soviet prisoners of war are hushed up.

2019 saw another wave of glorification of Nazis and their supporters. On 27 July the admirers of the 20th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (Estonian Legion) held another of their meetings in the village of Sinimäe, Ida-Viru County. The event was organized by Tarmo Kruusimäe, MP representing the governing Isamaa party and the members of the Society of the Estonian Legion Friends (SELF). This commemoration honoring those who fought for the Hitlerite Gernany, was attended by nearly 200 persons, including MPs representing the governing Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (including Ruuben Kaalep, head of the party’s youth movement Blue Awakening), members and veterans of Estonian Defence Forces, Kaitseliit paramilitary unit, local nationalist associations and their fellows from Latvia and Finland. A wreath sent by the Ministry of Defense of Estonia with the inscription “From Estonian people” was laid to the monument of Waffen-SS members. Some participants openly demonstrated Waffen-SS symbols. On 30 August Raivo Aeg, Minister of Justice of Estonia decorated 36 “fighters for Estonia’s freedom” with oak-leaf wreathes of liberty, a national Estonian award. As he stated during the ceremony, even the harshest words could not describe the horrors that Estonian people had had to go through. Everyone who fought for Estonia’s freedom, Forest Brothers, Finns, war veterans, members of underground groups, dissidents have all deserved awards. It is noteworthy that the list of those awarded included none of those who fought to defend and free Estonia from the Nazi occupation in 1941–1944. The same month, on 2 August, the 20th youth military and patriotic game titled Erna Raid took place. This game basically reproduces the raid of German Abwehr reconnaissance and sabotage group composed of Estonians and Finns and sent to operate deep behind the Soviet Army lines in summer 1941. This “military and patriotic event” is held annually by Estonian scouts’ movement and the Ministry of Defense of Estonia and traditionally features youth activists and members of NATO troops deployed in the country.

The third Estonian edition of Mein Kampf issued by Matrix Publishing attracted significant public attention. The book is sold both on-line and in small bookshops. It appears to be in great demand, which causes our grave concern.

Estonian public met with rejection a fair held in the premises of NATO military base in the town of Valga, where items with Nazi symbols were openly sold (Nazi Germany posters in Estonian, portraits of Adolf Hitler, recordings of Nazi military marches, gear and uniforms bearing Waffen-SS insignia, flags and bands with swastikas), as well as literature on Latvian and Estonian legions.

In addition to the above issues that affect the situation of the Russian-speaking population and national minorities to certain extent, the rights and interests of Russian-speaking residents of the country in social and economic spheres are also infringed. According to statistical data, the share of unemployed is twice as high among the Russian-speaking population as in Estonian one. There is clear disparity in the public service sector, where the share of non-Estonians does not exceed three per cent.


Document data: 07.02.2020 report by Russia’s MFA. Link: https://www.mid.ru/publikacii/-/asset_publisher/nTzOQTrrCFd0/content/id/4025481?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_nTzOQTrrCFd0&_101_INSTANCE_nTzOQTrrCFd0_languageId=en_GB Also available in Russian: https://www.mid.ru/publikacii/-/asset_publisher/nTzOQTrrCFd0/content/id/4025481

CPT report on the 2017 visit (excerpts), 2019

B. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Justice

[..]

3. Conditions of detention

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52. As regards the regime, the CPT acknowledges the efforts made by the Estonian authorities to provide sentenced prisoners with purposeful out-of-cell activities. It is also noteworthy that many sentenced prisoners benefited from an open-door regime for much of the day.

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Further, at Tallinn Prison, almost one-third of the sentenced prisoners had access either to education (including language classes in Estonian) or to vocational training in workshops (such as carpentry, shoe repairs, welding and metalwork). At Tartu and Viru Prisons, such activities were offered to approximately one-fifth of the sentenced prisoners.

[..]

53. In the three prisons, remand prisoners generally had only very few opportunities for work and educational activities. 42 Further, they were usually not allowed to use the existing sports facilities, and other recreational activities were very limited.

42 For instance, at Tallinn Prison, seven remand inmates were enrolled in formal education and five attended Estonian language courses.

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5. Other issues

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d. legal remedies and complaints procedures

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87. Further, prisoners could in principle lodge complaints with external bodies, in particular to the relevant Prison Committee60 and the Chancellor of Justice (Ombudsman).

60 For further details, see paragraph 101 of the report on the 2012 visit (CPT/Inf (2014) 1).

That said, a number of prisoners interviewed by the delegation appeared to be unaware of the existence of such complaints procedures. The CPT reiterates its recommendation that measures be taken in all prisons to provide prisoners with the necessary information, in a language they understand, on all existing external complaints mechanisms.


Document data: CPT/Inf (2019) 31; published 19.11.2019. Link: https://rm.coe.int/168098db93

HRC views in P. L. and M. L. v. Estonia (excerpts), 2019

The complaint

3.1 The authors claim that the State party’s denial of restitution of their property amounts to a violation of articles 2, 14 and 26 of the Covenant. The authors are entitled to recover their property or to receive equivalent compensation. They claim that they suffered discrimination because other claimants in the same position were able to recover their property from the State party, regardless of whether they had received payments under the German Equalization of Burdens Act. In particular, Estonians living in Estonia were able to recover their property, which was not the case for those living abroad. Other Baltic Germans were also able to fully recover their property.

[..]

State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

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4.9 The authors have also failed to substantiate their claim that the State party’s courts discriminated against them on account of their Baltic German origin by deciding that they were not entitled to the return of property or compensation because they had already received compensation. In contrast with the Committee’s decisions in Simunek et al. (CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992) and Adam v. Czech Republic (CCPR/C/57/D/586/1994), the facts of the present case do not raise an issue under article 26 of the Covenant.

4.10 In the authors’ case, the applicable laws do not differentiate between former owners of expropriated property on any grounds, including those mentioned in article 26 of the Covenant. According to section 17 (5) of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act, the only criterion for deciding whether a person covered by that provision can claim return or compensation is whether the property has already been returned to that person or whether he or she has received compensation. The authors have provided no arguments or evidence to substantiate their claim that in considering the payments received by their grandmother from Germany as compensation in the sense of section 17 (5) of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act, the Court of Appeal was motivated by their Baltic German heritage. The authors have also failed to explain how the conditions established by section 17 (5) of that Act are linked to national or ethnic origin.

[..]

4.16 The authors have also not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that, contrary to article 26 of the Covenant, Baltic Germans were treated differently or less favorably than any other group of people, including native Estonians, who filed claims for return of or compensation for unlawfully expropriated property. Their statements about the “unpopularity” of granting restitution to the Baltic Germans are arbitrary and false. Even more arbitrary is to suggest that Estonian courts operate according to the alleged popularity or unpopularity of certain ethnic groups. Section 17 (5) of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act applies to everyone, without distinction based on nationality, ethnic origin or any other ground. The only criterion is whether the property has been returned or compensation paid.

4.17 The falseness of the authors’ claim that the Estonian authorities discriminate against Baltic Germans by refusing to return or to compensate for unlawfully expropriated property can be further demonstrated by several similar cases, in which the courts decided in claimants’ favor when there was no concrete evidence that compensation had been paid by Germany. These cases demonstrate that the solution is based on law and evidence, not on biases against certain ethnic groups. In the authors’ case, evidence existed to conclude that the compensation payments were indeed made and that they were made for the loss of their grandmother’s property in Tallinn.

Authors’ comments on the State party’s observations on admissibility and the merits

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5.8 As to the merits, the relevant question before the Committee is to determine whether the State party’s authorities have discriminated against those who resettled in 1941. In particular, on 10 March 2008, the General Assembly of the Supreme Court held that these Baltic German resettlers must be treated equally to other subjects entitled to restitution and that applications for the return of property should be reconsidered. The authors therefore, had a legitimate expectation for the return of their property. However, in almost all the applications for return of property – that is, more than 30 cases – the Estonian authorities invoked evidence of compensation under the German Equalization of Burdens Act.

[..]

5.14 Lastly, the authors disagree that the two cases referred to by the State party represent proof of non-discrimination against Baltic Germans.

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Issues and proceedings before the Committee

Consideration of admissibility

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6.4 The Committee notes the authors’ claims under articles 2, 14 and 26 of the Covenant that they suffered discrimination and denial of justice by the State party’s courts and that the administrative and judicial proceedings between 1991 and 2013 have exceeded the reasonable time requirement.

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6.9 The Committee notes that although the authors’ main claims relate to property rights, which are not themselves protected by the Covenant, the authors also allege that the decision of the Court of Appeal was discriminatory and amounted to denial of justice. In this connection, the Committee notes that the authors’ claims relate to the interpretation and application of domestic law and practice by the courts of the State party. The Committee recalls that it is generally for the courts of States parties to review facts and evidence, or the application of domestic legislation, in a particular case, unless it can be shown that such evaluation or application was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice, or that the court otherwise violated its obligation of independence and impartiality.

6.10 In the present case, the Committee notes that the authors have not demonstrated that the applicable domestic legislation – that is, section 17 (5) of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act – provides for any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The Committee notes that the only criterion imposed by that section is whether the property in question has already been returned or compensation has already been paid. The Court of Appeal, after taking into account the authors’ situation, based its decision on that provision of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act. The authors have failed to demonstrate that the application of that law was discriminatory, or to cite any relevant jurisprudence that would show a different application of the law based on nationality. The Committee is therefore not in a position to conclude, on the basis of the material at its disposal, that the domestic courts acted arbitrarily or that their decision amounted to discrimination, arbitrariness or denial of justice. Accordingly, the Committee considers that this part of the communication is insufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility and declares it inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.


Document data: 08.11.2019, published 25.11.2019. CCPR/C/127/D/2499/2014 Link: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f127%2fD%2f2499%2f2014 Also available in Russian and French